Introduction
In 1949, the United Nations International Law Commission quietly decided to "refrain from using the e�pression 'civilized countries'" 1 in its deliberations. An era had apparently died away, only to be resurrected as part of the discourse of the post-September 11, 2001, United States' "War on Terror". Despite the resurgence of rhetorical use of "civilisation", the notion of "civilised nation" never truly left the stage of international relations, as it remains on the books today, a part of international law. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice mandates that the International Court apply international law from three sources, not only treaty and customary law, but also: "(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations". This provision is a much needed window onto a bygone era, as some have said an embarrassing reminder that international law acted as an instrument of imperial design. Much needed, as at the time such a designation as "civilised nations" would have appeared neutral and benign. This begs the questions: Is international law, and does it remain, structurally biased in favour of the West and its informal empire, while couched in more benevolent, universal language of, say, human rights?
This article considers an instance of the transition from the "law of Christian nations" and the "public law of Europe" of the nineteenth century to "international law" of the twentieth century wherein non-European States were allowed to join the international qua European system of international relations on the basis of a fluctuating rule of "civilisation" dictated by European colonial powers. The standard of civilisation which was applied in the Ethiopian conte�t, upon which its admission to the League of Nations was predicated and later used to justify Italian aggression, was the abolition of slavery and the slave trade on its territory. The Ethiopian e�perience is considered here as a vehicle to study the emergence of slavery as the "first" human right given voice internationally; the manner in which the League of Nations, having established the abolition of slavery and the slave trade as a criteria of "civilisation" moved to codify it; * The author wishes to acknowledge the receipt of a Overseas Conference Grant from the British Academy which allowed for the presentation of this article as a paper at Biennial Conference of the European Society of International Law, at Université Paris I, in May 2006. or "barbaric"; and "uncivilised" or "savage" States was at once a manifestation of a State's ability to counter, in limited terms, European encroachment and a recognition of a State's legal standing internationally. For those States where outright conquest did not transpire, European e�traterritoriality in the guise of unequal treaties, capitulations, and protectorate regimes were put into place. For Brett Bowden, the "importance of the classical standard of civilization can not be underestimated" specifically with regard to "the violent European civilizing mission that it helped give rise to". 7 Antony Anghie, for his part, points to the use of the apparently benign term "civilisation" as being used to justify the continued e�pansion of the European colonial project: "vocabulary of international law, far from being neutral, or abstract, is mired in this history of subordination and e�tinguishing alien cultures". This is so, as Anghie notes, in reference to the work of Francisco de Vitoria:
"European practices are posited as universally applicable norms with which the colonial peoples must conform if they are to avoid sanctions and achieve full membership. Vitoria's jurisprudence demonstrates, furthermore that the construction of the barbarian as both within the reach of the law and yet outside its protection creates an object against which sovereignty may e�press its fullest powers by engaging in an unmediated and unqualified violence, justified as leading to conversion, salvation, civilization. Non-European peoples have been continuously characterised as the barbarians compelling the further e�tension of international law's ambit". 8 Where international law is concerned, the notion of "civilisation" was quite simply a criteria of State recognition. Gong, makes clear, having considered international instruments and conducted a genealogical study of the evolution of the concept of civilisation in the writings of leading contemporary international law publicists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, that the notion of civilisation, although rather fluid, was very much a principle of public international law. For his part, Georg Schwarzenberger, writing in 1955, laid out the characteristics of the principle:
"The test whether a State was civilised and, thus entitled to full recognition as an international personality was, as a rule, merely whether its government was sufficiently stable to undertake binding commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty and property of foreigners. In a multitude of treaties these minimum standards were codified into rules of international customary law".
Gerrit Gong outlines the five tenets of what was required to be considered "civilised". Such a State would have to: 1) ensure basic rights: life, property, freedom to travel, commerce, religion; 2) have an organized political structure and the ability to act in self-defence; 3) accept the norms of international law; and 4) have the ability to carry diplomatic relations with other States. More subjectively, but of specific importance to this study: 5) "a 'civilized' state by and large conforms to the accepted norms and practices of the 'civilized' international society, e.g., suttee, polygamy, and slavery were considered 'uncivilized', and therefore unacceptable." Having elaborated these tenets, Gong, however, remained cautious, seeing in the incorporation of "civilisation" in international law a fundamental problem:
"the standard was never much more than a fairly blunt legal instrument. Even after it emerged as an e�plicit legal concept, the standard was still subject to the admi�ture of contrasting elements -political and legal, subjective and objective, e�plicit and implicit -associated with any doctrine of recognition". 10 It should be said that this elasticity of the concept of civilisation was most evident in regard to the legacy of the League of Nations' actions involving Ethiopia. The standard of civilisation that was used in this instance was the rather slippery "norms and practices of the 'civilised' international society", manifest in the outlawing of slavery and the slave trade. This was so as Ethiopia had, by the 1920s, met the first four tenets noted by Gong; but, its consolidation of effective control over territory from the mid-eighteenth century onwards had come as a result of warfare, which had, as a by-product, the production of slaves as prisoners qua spoils of war.
Slavery and the Consolidation of the Ethiopian Empire
The consolidation of the Ethiopian Empire was a long process which transpired during the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. Like German and Italian unification during the 1850s and 1860s, Ethiopian State-building was predicated on belligerent co-opting of the peripheries: the requirement of peaceful submission or armed conquest. In the Ethiopian conte�t, the iconic photo of the last King of Kafa, Tato Gaki Sherocho, bound in chains after his defeat in 1897, speaks to the consolidation of modern Ethiopia. 11 The modern move to unify Ethiopia was brought about by Kasa Haylu, who pacified much of the country north of the Rift Valley. Having learnt his military skills through the repulsing of Egyptian troops from his fiefdom on the Ethio-Sudanese frontier in the 1830s, Kasa -upon becoming Emperor Tewodros II (1855-1868), King of Kings of Ethiopia, in 1855 -turned his attention to the southern half of Ethiopia, in essence moving the country's centre of gravity southwards and away from its Nilitic sources. It was during this southern campaign that Tewodros "made the first attempt to put an end to the slave-trade which had become endemic in Ethiopian society".
12
The ever-present Egyptian threat to Ethiopia emerged again in the early 1870s, when the importance of the Horn of Africa grew as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal and Egypt's ambitions over the Nile Valley spread. Egypt's Khedive Ismail, having subjugated Sudan, justified his e�pansion into Ethiopia "in terms of eradication of the slave-trade". 13 Yet, this adventure was ultimately unsuccessful, as the Ethiopian "victories" at Gundat and Gura in 1875 and 1876 "hastened Ismail's downfall and the subsequent British occupation of Egypt".
14 These victories in battle, however were not consolidated in peace, as the Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889) was faced with a further threat from the north, this time from the Sudanese Mahdist movement. The cooperation undertaken with the British to suppress the Mahdist was to have a long-term price for Ethiopia as, by way of the 1885 Adwa Peace Treaty settling the war with Egypt, Britain gained what is now the Eritrean capital of Massawa which it shortly thereafter handed it over to Italy. As for Yohannes' attempts at nation-building, these were of limited success, as he sought to consolidate his power base through a "loosely united Ethiopia, with autonomous regional rulers under an emperor e�ercising benevolent political suzerainty".
15
It was left to Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913), therefore, to consolidate the Ethiopian Empire as a sovereign State. "It was to be", historian Bahru Zewde writes, Menelik's "main claim to historical distinction that he presided over the realization of an idea that had first been kindled in the fiery mind of Tewodros. Yet the final result bore little resemblance to the initial dream". 16 This was so, as Tewodros had sought a rather modest Nilitic empire, one in line with a previous medieval incarnation; whereas Menelik created the Ethiopia of today, one which straddles equally both sides of the Rift Valley. Where Menelik's imperial design fell short, however, was with regard to access to the sea, as this was the era of the "Scramble for Africa" wherein European States first made claims to the African coastal regions before moving inland. Ethiopia was thus made contiguous to Italian (Eritrea and Italian Somaliland); French (Djibouti); and British (British Somaliland) territories on the Horn of Africa. It was left to the Italians, latecomers to Empire, to lay claim to Ethiopia as a colony. As a result of a dispute over the interpretation of the 1889 Wuchale Treaty of Amity (as regards its Italian and Amharic versions), Italy claimed protectorate status over Ethiopia, which was duly recognised by European powers. However, Menelik, who had refused to accept this interpretation, denounced the Treaty in 1893, having prepared Ethiopia for war. The outcome of the 1896 Battle at Adwa "was a remarkable victory for Menelik, and a complete defeat for his enemies"; the Italians were thus forced to agree "on 26 October, to the Peace Treaty of Addis Ababa, which annulled the Treaty of Wuchale and recognized the absolute independence of Ethiopia".
17
The Ethiopian success at Adwa, the first defeat of a European Power during the colonial period and the only complete defeat of such a Power in the African conte�t had many a repercussion. Most important for Ethiopia, in regard to its international relations, was the consolidation of its territory vis-à-vis its European neighbours, brought on by European "apprehension of the e�pansive potentialities of post-Adwa Ethiopia". 18 Thus, in just over a decade, between 1897 and 1908, not only were boundaries delimitated on the Horn of Africa, but also with the British in regard to Sudan and British East Africa (Kenya).
19 With respect to internal affairs, Menelik sought to modernise the Empire, he "advanced ideas of social reform, and decreed the abolition of slavery".
20
But as Jones and Monroe note in their 1935 study, Menelik's reforms "would have been more effective had he personally supervised their e�ecution; as it was, he was usually too busy consolidation his frontiers". 21 In his autobiography, Emperor Haile Sellasie considered his predecessors' measures in regard to slavery and noted that slavery itself had "remained firmly established by custom". "Consequently", the Emperor -writing in e�ile in 1937 -stated that:
"Emperors Theodore (Tewodros), Yohannes, and Menelik, who reigned in Ethiopia from , had promulgated decrees against the sale and purchase of slaves in Ethiopia. But because at the time it was not customary to set up special offices for work of this kind, their intentions remained unaccomplished, as it was impossible to observe and enforce the decree on account of the vastness of the country".
22
A more detached view which has been e�pressed regarding Ethiopia, during the reign of these three Emperors, was that Ethiopians were not per se against slavery, that "the country was surrounded on all sides by slave raiders and traders", and that no concerted effort was ever made to seek to end the trade or slavery. The failure to act resulted from the following: "The fact that Ethiopia managed to maintain its independence throughout the nineteenth century and that Europeans were not involved in its internal affairs, left the rulers to a large degree free from outside pressure to suppress the slave trade, even if they opposed it personally. They realized that they lacked both the power and the popular support to accomplish the task. For the same reason, they had no wish to abolish the institution of slavery".
23
Ultimately, by the time of Haile Sellasie's ascendance to power as the Regent, Ras Tafari Makonnen, in 1916, Ethiopia had consolidated its e�ternal borders but had yet to effectuate control over its territory and actively seek the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. The e�tent to which slavery was not truly an issue in the Ethiopian conte�t might best be e�emplified by the short-lived reign of Lej Iyyasu (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) who had personally gone on a slave-raiding e�pedition in 1912, "a most nefarious campaign of his career. Against the Dizi in south-western Ethiopia, which ended up with the enslavement of tens of thousands of the inhabitants"!
24
"Abyssinian" 25 Admission to the League of Nations in 1923
Ethiopia's admission to the League of Nations came as an attempt to shield itself from possible outside encroachment from the British, French or Italians, who had agreed in 1906 by way of a tripartite instrument to "spheres of influence" over it. 26 The acute nature of that threat was revealed in a 1922 Memorandum to the Council of the League of Nations by Sir Frederick Lugard, a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission which pointed to either the three Powers taking control of Ethiopia or, better yet, the League of Nations. Lugard was considered one of the leading e�perts on issues of slavery of the day and had been very much "in the public eye, taking an active part in the controversy over Ethiopian slavery". 27 In that well-circulated Memorandum, Lugard argued that, as a result of the inability of Ethiopia to suppress the slave trade, it should be placed under a scheme which "would be little different in principle from the B class Mandates. 'its e�istence as a independent nation can provisionally be recognised, subject to the rendering of Administrative advice and assistance' -not by a Mandatory, but by the League itself". 28 Where Lugard's calculations in regard to Ethiopia went wrong, however, was in regard to that State's willingness to apply for admission to the League of Nations. 29 Lugard wrote less than a year before Ethiopian entry into the League of Nations that "Abyssinia has not applied, and since her chief desire is to avoid any foreign interference in her affairs -least of all the e�posure to scandal -she is not likely to do so". 30 Despite this threat from the League of Nations itself, Ethiopia couched its wish to join the League in terms of an isolated Christian State surrounded by Muslim "heathens", thus seeking a collective security umbrella and wishing to maintain the peaceful co-e�istence it currently enjoyed with its neighbours.
31
It might also be noted that Ethiopia's attempted entry into the League coincided with the wishes of the British Anti-Slavery Society, which sought to internationalise issues of the repression of slavery but could not focus on an independent Ethiopia -which it considered the main culprit of the slave trade -as long as it was not a member of the League of Nations.
32 This was to have important ramifications, as France considered that the agitations of the Anti-Slavery Society was a prelude to British intervention in Ethiopia and thus precipitated its support -or as the Professor of African History, Suzanne Miers, writes "instigation" -of Ethiopia's admission into the League of Nations. 33 The wish to join the League was, of course, something which was not forced upon Ethiopia, but was something it sought, as: The fact that the Anti-Slavery Society supported Ethiopia's admission should not be confused with British support of Ethiopia's bid, as the British Government "strongly opposed Ethiopian admission to the League, believing that her application was a French plot to flood the country with arms on the prete�t that they were needed to fight slavery". 35 Further, Miers' relates that the "British were outraged. They thought Ethiopia was 'unfit' for membership and that its admission would mean that in the future there would be 'no ground for e�cluding anybody'". 36 This lack of British support for Ethiopia's application was made evident by the British Delegate to the League of Nations, Mr. Wood, when he ventured that there were two conflicting motives to be taken into consideration when contemplating the admission of Ethiopia to the League: "on the one hand, the desire to help Abyssinia to raise herself in the scale of civilisation, which it was possible she might do more effectively if she became a Member of the League, and on the other hand, the feeling that the well-being of the League depended on the level of public opinion in each of the Member States. It was most important that [we] should consider very carefully from this point of view whether Abyssinia was in a position to make a worthy contribution to the League".
37
Ethiopia's request for admission to the League of Nations was considered by the Si�th Committee (Political) of the Assembly of the League of Nations, which delegated that power to a sub-committee to investigate the issue. The Sub-Committee used a questionnaire that had been employed previously when considering other applications to the League. Gerrit Gong writes that the questions were a "codified e�pression of the standard of 'civilization' and a predecessor in some ways to the [1933] Montevideo Convention" on the Rights and Duties of States. 38 In its Report back to the Si�th Committee, the Sub-Committee dealt summarily with the first three questions: The Sub-Committee noted that questions one and three returned affirmative answers, while question two elicited the following response: "the Sub-Committee notes that Abyssinia is recognised by and has concluded treaties with several Powers". As for the fourth question: "Is it full self-governing?", the Sub-Committee noted that it "was unable to determine e�actly the e�tent of the effective control of the central authority over the provinces remote to the capital" but, nevertheless, "is of the opinion that Abyssinia is fully self-governed". 40 Finally, the fifth question, although couched in general terms, allowed the Assembly to condition Ethiopia's admission to the League of Nations on the suppression of slavery and its willingness to provide any information which the Council of the League might request on the matter. The fifth question reads as follows: 3. Abyssinia declares herself ready now and hereafter to furnish the Council with any information which it may require, and to take into consideration any recommendations which the Council may make with regard to the fulfillment of these obligations, which she recognizes that the League of Nations is concerned".
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With regard to the first paragraph of this Declaration, Ethiopia had to agree by way of Article 11 of the Convention of Saint Germain-en-Laye "to watch over the preservation Convention of Saint Germain-en-Laye "to watch over the preservation Saint Germain-en-Laye "to watch over the preservation to watch over the preservation of the native populations and to supervise the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being"; but more specifically, it had to: "endeavour to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea". It was on this basis that Ethiopia's application for admission to the League of Nations rested. For its part, the link between the issue of slavery and "civilisation" was the link between the issue of slavery and "civilisation" was articulated by the Italian member of the Si�th Committee, Count Bonin-Longare, as he noted that the Sub-Committee:
"had thought it right to ask, and had asked, for one guarantee, namely, that she should accept the principles adopted by the other States with regard to slavery in their most recent contractual form, namely, that found in the Convention of St. Germain. That request contained nothing to wound Abyssinia's susceptibilities, since other States, which had arrived at a higher degree of civilisation, had already consented to undertake special engagements not included in the Covenant". Ethiopia's response to this conditional acceptance of membership was sent by telegraph to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on 20 September 1923, informing him that the "Imperial Government accepts the undertakings proposed by the Si�th Committee and has the honour to inform you that it fully empowers its Delegation to sign such undertakings in its name". 45 This being so, the way was clear for Ethiopia's unanimous admission to the League of Nations on 28 September 1923; Britain, "not wanting to be the lone dissenter […] accepted the inevitable". 
The 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery
The general prohibition against slavery and the slave trade in international law emanates from a wish to consider the issues specifically in regard to Ethiopia. In 1922, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, the Delegate from New Zealand submitted two Resolutions to the Assembly of the League of Nations, the first requesting an inquiry into slave-trading in Ethiopia; the second with slavery in Africa, more generally. Ultimately, a single, rather general, resolution was adopted: "to refer to the appropriate Committee the question of the recrudescence of slavery in Africa in order that it be considered and propose the best methods for combating the evil".
47 "This all-embracing resolution", Miers writes, "was intended to disarm suspicions that it was an attack on one country". 48 With Ethiopia's subsequent admission as a Member of the League one year later, the attention of the League of Nations with regard to the issue of slavery turned toward the promotion of an international instrument to end slavery and the slave trade. This call for a treaty flowed from the fact that States had shown little interest in responding to a 1922 questionnaire that had been send out on behalf of the League of Nations by a sub-committee of the Assembly. A year later that sub-committee sought to have the Council of the League "entrust to a competent body the duty of continuing the investigation [of the question of slavery] with a view to obtaining further information on the subject". 49 As a result, the Council of the League of Nations created, on 14 March 1924, the Temporary Slavery Commission, a body that would e�ist for only two years but would fundamentally change the emphasis of the League's work in the area of slavery from compiling information, to legislating the international suppression of slavery. 50 The Temporary Slavery Commission, in its final report of 25 July 1925, called on States to consider the "abolition of the legal status of slavery". To that end, it emphasised that the "most important measure for the gradual abolition of slavery is that the status of slavery should no longer be recognised in the eye of the law". Furthermore, the Commission sought to define what it meant by the notion of abolition of the legal status of slavery:
"The 'abolition of the legal status' means that every slave has the right to assert his freedom, without ransom and without going through any formal process of fulfilling any prior condition, by simply leaving his master if he desire to do so. He enjoys and can e�ercise all the civil rights of a free man -e.g., can sue and be sued in court, can prosecute his master for ill-treatment, and can bequeath and inherit property". 51 While the Commission gave voice to issues regarding the slave trade, slave-raiding, serfdom, and forced labour in its Report; its most enduring contribution was the call for an international convention on slavery. 52 As Viscount Robert Cecil of Chelwood would later relate, when that Report of the Temporary Slavery Commission was delivered to the Assembly of the League of Nations, the Si�th Committee of the Assembly had picked up on this notion of an international instrument and had prepared one for consideration by the Assembly. Viscount Cecil proposed a resolution to the Assembly that the 1925 Draft Convention be sent to Governments and considered with an eye to representatives being given Full Power by the ne�t annual meeting of the Assembly "to sign the Convention with or without alteration". 53 The 1925 Draft Convention which Viscount Cecil would lay before the Assembly was penned by none other than Sir Frederick Lugard, who had been appointed as a member of the Temporary Slavery Commission. Using the Lugard Draft as a basis, the British Government prepared its own "watered down version of the treaty".
54 That 1925 Draft Protocol was considered by the League of Nations Assembly after having been modified by the "Si�th Committee, with the help of a Sub-Committee and a small Drafting Committee". 55 In presenting the 1925 Draft Convention, Viscount Cecil understood that what had emerged was not as strong as it might otherwise have been, noting to the Assembly that what was on offer was "general principles which might be adopted usefully by all civilized nations as a minimum code in the matter of slavery" 56 . By the wording of the Resolution adopted by the Assembly, it was clear that its wish was that States would accept the 1925 Draft Convention in the form it was presented, as far as possible; thus avoiding the need to convene an ad hoc conference to negotiate and adopt the instrument. In the course of the subsequent year a number of States made observations in regard to the 1925 Draft Convention and ultimately a revision of its provisions took place within the League of Nations in 1926. For its part, the 1925 Draft Convention was sustained grosso motto and found the light of day through its incorporation in the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery.
Where the actual definition of "slavery" is concerned, the definition which was adopted in the 1925 British Protocol was modified over the rather short period between 9 September and 26 September 1925, when the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the 1925 Draft Convention. As originally conceived by the British Protocol, the definition of slavery read: "is a status in which one person e�ercises a right of property over another". 57 "[…] the natural freedom of will possessed by a person to offer or render his labour or to control the fruits thereof or the consideration therefrom is taken from him".
60
One further element in regard to the definition of "slavery" as developed by the League of Nations might be mentioned. In his Report to the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1926 Viscount Cecil sought, in a rather back-door manner, to voice the Si�th Committee's understanding of a wider definition of slavery. Speaking in regard to Article 2 -which will be considered shortly -he noted that the emphasis in that Article on "domestic slavery and similar conditions" had been omitted "because it was believed that such conditions came within the definition of slavery contained in the first article and that no further prohibition of them in e�press terms was necessary". Cecil went on to say that:
"This applies not only to domestic slavery but to all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery Commission and to which I referred to last year, i.e., 'debt slavery', the enslaving of persons disguised as the adoption of children, and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, etc."
To his credit, however, Viscount Cecil did qualify this pronouncement saying that "even if, as is possible, these last practices do not come under the definition of slavery as it is given in Article 1, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that they must be combated". With regard to the definition of the "slave trade", its evolution within the League of Nations was without much difficulty or discussion. It was, as Viscount Cecil noted, "primarily the result of the work of legal e�perts, and is based on the minimum provisions of e�isting colonial legislation and on the previous international convention on this subject. Overall, the provisions of Article 2, from the 1925 British Draft Protocol to its inclusion in the 1926 Convention, proposed clearer obligations with regard to the slave trade but more nuanced obligations in regard to slavery. In proposing the 1925 Draft Protocol, Viscount Cecil noted that obligations being sought with regard to slavery were "very cautiously worded". 67 "The Si�th Committee was of the opinion that the abolition of slavery could only be successfully brought about with due regard to the maintenance of order and the well-being of the peoples concerned. This accounts for the use of the word "progressively" employed in paragraph (b) for it was recognise that in certain cases in the past the attempt to do away with slavery and other similar conditions it an abrupt manner, although noble in its inspiration, has resulted in unforeseen hardships for the individuals whose conditions it was sought to alleviate, and even in grave social upheavals".
Viscount Cecil continued by saying that it "must be left to the judgement of the Government responsible", as circumstances varied from State to State; and that the Committee was ready to concede that "in certain cases there could be an arrangement whereby freed slaves in possession of all their natural and civil rights might be obliged to continue to serve their former masters for a certain time, but only subject to the obligations and rights consequent upon a labour contract". 68 By way of an overall assessment of Article 2, Cecil concluded that the Si�th Committee "interprets Article 2 as tending to bring about the disappearance from written legislation or from the custom of the country of everything which admits the maintenance by a private individual of rights over another person of the same nature as the rights which an individual can have over things". 69 Thus, what originally started as a process to investigate slavery in the Ethiopian conte�t developed ultimately into an international instrument governing the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. In bringing 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery into e�istence, the League of Nations did not abolish slavery or the slave trade per se; instead it called upon consenting States to be bound by the Convention to "prevent and suppress the slave trade" and to bring about "progressively and as soon as possible" the "complete abolition of slavery in all its forms". This incremental means of abolishing the slave trade and slavery was to be important in the conte�t of Ethiopia as -although it would not become party to the 1926 Convention during the League era -it took the Convention's lead in seeking to demonstrate from even before it joined the League of Nations that it was actively, though slowly, seeking to abolish both slavery and the slave trade. 
Meetings of the Committees, Minutes of the Sixth Committee (Political Questions
)
Ethiopia, Slavery and the League of Nations
In April 1924, less than a year after having been admitted to the League of Nations, the Regent Ras Tafari provided a Report to the League of Nations in regard to the question of slavery in Ethiopia on behalf of his Government. He emphasised that the suppression of the slave trade could now be considered as the Empire had been consolidated: "Only when the unity of the Empire was attained under the Emperor Menelik II, and the chiefs of the provinces as well as the chiefs of the Kingdom under the suzerainty of the Emperor were definitely subjected to his authority, could the slave trade be effectively suppressed". 70 The Report followed by saying that the "present Government, which adopts energetic and ruthless methods against slave dealers, has succeeded in almost totally suppressing the trade.
[…] It may be said that at the present time the slave trade no longer e�ists in Abyssinia, e�cept in isolated cases which are becoming increasingly rare". With respect to slavery, "immediate abolition does not seem possible, but the Abyssinian Government has issued regulations which will, it is hoped, produce the best results". 71 Those Regulations, issued in March 1924 were far reaching as they mandated the emancipation of slaves for the first time in Ethiopian history. However, as historian Richard Pankhurst notes, the new law was "limited in scope, it envisaged the gradual and ultimately complete liberation of all slaves".
Article 1 of the Regulations for the Emancipation of Slaves and their Conditions of
Life sought to justify this gradual approach noting that if all slaves were to be freed at once, "they might become thieves, bandits and malefactors, thereby disturbing the public peace. They shall accordingly remain in the hands of their masters". The Regulations then set out the circumstances under which slaves would be set free or considered as being free, such as all children born after 1924 and all other slaves seven years after the death of their master. In addition, it regulated and limited the ability of masters to reclaim runaway slaves; it set out penalties for slave trading; and created slave courts throughout Ethiopia. As Suzanne Miers relates; "on paper, therefore, a significant advance had been made", 73 although the reality was that slavery and slave trading would persist for some time in Ethiopia. The Regulations, however had an effect beyond the borders of the Empire, as the "Ethiopian reforms of 1924 defused criticism at the TSC" 74 -the Temporary Slavery Commission of the League of Nations. Within the works of the Temporary Slavery Commission, Sir Frederick Lugard had anne�ed to a general consideration of slavery a specific study of Ethiopia. In that Memorandum, entitled "Conditions in Abyssinia", Lugard noted that Ras Tafari "though sincere and eager for reform, has not the means at his command" to suppress issues related to slavery and he noted that "the evidence shows that slavery, slave-dealing and occasional slaveraiding, still e�ist in Abyssinia". As such, he drew the conclusion that the "conditions of admission to Membership of the League have not therefore been carried out, and in present circumstances there seems little prospect of their fulfilment". Lugard called upon the League to establish a commission of enquiry which would travel to Ethiopia to report on the "e�isting conditions in regard to slavery and forced labour, and to make recommendations". 75 The Temporary Slavery Commission for its part, did not see fit to pursue this line of inquiry. Instead, it suggested, in its 1925 Report, regarding to the legal status of slavery, that:
"The Abyssinian Government could hardly be asked to do more in this respect for the moment. In order, however, to hasten the liberation of slaves so far as circumstances permit, the attention of this Government might be called to certain transitional measures which have been successfully applied in other countries with this object, such as:
To encourage the principal chiefs in the provinces to set an e�ample by liberating their own slaves […];
To register slaves and to liberate those who by a certain date have not been registered. This measure would, it is true involve the recognition of the status of slavery -a status which, however, is still recognised by the Government of Abyssinia;
On the other hand, to 'abolish the legal status of slavery', […] but with the reservation that the person thus legally freed might be obliged for a fi�ed period to continue to serve their former master as if they were bound by a contract of labour".
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As far as issues of the slave-trade were concerned, the Temporary Slavery Commission supported the Ethiopian call for the colonial Powers which occupied the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa to cooperate and coordinate their activities if the trade in Ethiopia was to ultimately be suppressed. In presenting the Report to the Si�th Committee, the Chairman of the Temporary Slavery Commission, Albrecht Gohr, noted in regard to Ethiopia that "the Committee recognised that the general customs and political situation in that country rendered it very difficult to abolish slavery in one stroke". 77 did sound a warning shot across Ethiopia's bow in linking the e�istence of slavery in Ethiopia to membership, albeit, to application for future membership to the League of Nations: "Further, the Committee suggested that the League of Nations should admit in the future States not Members only when they have given proof of their desire to abolish slavery. If these abolitions could not take place at once, certain transitional measures were recommended".
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As the Temporary Slavery Commission gave way to a move to establish an international instrument in regard to issues of slavery, and a British proposal gave way to the 1925 Draft Convention prepared by the League of Nations, Ethiopia felt compelled -and was the only State to do so -to make a Declaration, which was attached to the minutes of League's Si�th Committee' consideration of the provision of that 1925 Draft Convention:
"Gentlemen, we, the Abyssinian delegation, fully and entirely concur with the lofty humanitarian principles embodied in the Protocol proposed by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, and together with our eminent colleagues on the Sub-Committee [which drafted the 1925 proposal], we have voted wholeheartedly for the adoption of its fundamental articles.
The dynasty descended from David and Solomon will leave nothing undone to ensure that the Protocol shall be given the widest possible application with the help and grace of God". 79 Yet, this Declaration rings hollow against Ethiopia's 1926 reply to the League's request to make comments on the substance of the 1925 Draft Convention; as in effect it was reported that the Emperor's "efforts are directed towards ensuring the strictest possible enforcement of [domestic] anti-slavery ordinances", and, as such, "will therefore, not be in a position to furnish this month sufficiently detailed replies indicating among the whole of the te�t accepted de plano, those concerning which some few provisional reservations might possibly have to be made". 80 Ethiopia, however ultimately did not need to make any reservations to the 1926 Convention during the League era, as it would only ratify it in 1969, though it was an original signatory on 25 September 1926. 81 Despite not being party to the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Ethiopia's dealing with issues regarding slavery remained on the agenda of the League of Nations, in part, as a result of a Resolution adopted by the Assembly on 78 Id., p. 11. the same day as the signing of the 1926 Convention, that noted: "the League of Nations should continue to interest itself in securing the progressive abolition of slavery and conditions analogous" and thus requested the Council to gather information, not only from the Parties to the 1926 Convention as required by Article 7; but also "any supplementary information which the Members of the League may be disposed spontaneously to furnish with regard to the measures taken by them to this end". 82 In 1927, the Si�th Committee had e�pressed its hope that Ethiopia would provide information in light of the previous year's Resolution 83 and; indeed, acknowledge receipt of such information, as the Ethiopian Government provided the League of Nation with a Note that included a "nominal" list of individuals who had been freed as a result of the 1924 Ethiopian Regulations and those that had been convicted since its coming into force. As far as the eleven hundred individuals who had been freed were concerned, not only was the number small compared to the two million slaves which the Regent considered to still e�ist in Ethiopia, but the estimates, it would emerge many years later, were the "equivalent to 'guess'". 84 Nevertheless, the Note concluded by stating that "it should be observed that, despite considerable distances and enormous difficulties, a considerable step forward has been taken on the road of civilisation and human liberty".
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While no notable mention of the issue of slavery in regard to Ethiopia was made before the League of Nations between 1927 and 1931; as a result of a League inquiry into issues of slavery in Liberia and fearing such a measure might be imposed on Ethiopia -the former Ras Tafari -now Emperor Haile Selassie I, undertook an action which "successfully disarmed criticism" by the newly established League of Nations' ad hoc Committee of E�perts on Slavery.
86 "In 1931", historian Suzanne Miers relates, "Haile Selassie was alarmed lest the new League committee might try to send out a commission of inquiry. He feared that the slavery issue might be made a prete�t for an attack on Ethiopian independence. Prompted by Lord Lugard (as he had become), the Emperor, in order to forestall any League action, asked the [British] antislavery society for help". 87 The Anti-Slavery Society sent a delegation in 1932 headed by Lord Noel-Bu�on, who gained a promise from the Emperor that slavery would end within twenty years. 88 This along with the establishment of a new Slavery Department "meant to supervise the slavery laws, register slaves, run the slavery courts, look after freed slaves and run its own police force", was enough to satisfy the Committee of E�perts on Slavery which simply provided suggestions to the Ethiopian Government, recognising that "the special situation in Abyssinia shows that it is at present impossible for the Abyssinian Government to abolish slavery by a stroke of the pen and that it is necessary that the Government should only advance by stages". 89 This gradual approach, it should be noted as an aside, was very much in line with the obligations which States that had ratified the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery had undertaken. Further, the Committee noted that a letter from the Emperor which was forwarded to the Committee by Lord Lugard included proposals "to take measures which forestall some of the recommendations of the Committee". 90 The recommendations which the Committee had made, it should be noted, were hardly intrusive. Supporting the Ethiopian incremental approach to the end of slavery, it noted that: "The main objective, however, should be to make the Abyssinians themselves realise fully the reprehensible character of slavery and the merit of spontaneous acts of liberation. Though laws may help to transform customs, the laws themselves are only fully applied if, in their conception, they reflect the sentiments of the general mass. It would appear that great progress has been made in this direction".
As such, the Government should seek the clergy's support in setting an e�ample by freeing their slaves, and "for instance", bestowing "rewards on those who voluntarily free their slaves".
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By the same token, the permanent body which replaced the ad hoc Committee of E�perts on Slaves, the Advisory Committee of E�perts, was rather supportive of Ethiopia's attempts to gradually end slavery, pointing to a further quantitative submission made by the Ethiopian Government in 1934, regarding slaves freed and individuals convicted.
92 While Professor Pankhurst pointed to a number of factors in the economic development of Ethiopia -as it related to the relationship between master and slave 88 Note that while Noel-Bu�on was sympathetic to the manner in which Haile Selassie was dealing with the issue of slavery, but in "his efforts to keep up the pressure, he proceeded to sour the relations with tactless talk and articles". -which "accelerated the emancipation process"; which meant that slavery, by "the early thirties, was thus at last beginning to be brought under control"; 93 the Ethiopian Governments pointed elsewhere. In its 1934 submission it noted that: "The opening up in recent years of several motor-tracks radiating from the capital, together with the quartering in many parts of the country of Central Government troops, trained according to the principles of modern military science, will certainly make it easier to stamp out the slave trade, while facilitating the general strict application of the Imperial laws for the liberation of slavers".
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In its 1936 Report, the Advisory Committee of E�perts simply noted, for the record, the legislation which had been passed to date by the Ethiopian Government in regard to the abolition of slavery by Ethiopia. It did so as events in Ethiopia had fundamentally changed, with the invasion and anne�ation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1935-1936.
Annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936
The road to Italian anne�ation of Ethiopia began in the Ogaden region, at Walwal, on 5 December 1934, when Ethiopian and Italian troops clashed as a result of a dispute over Italian claims to an oasis. By Italian admission; some years earlier "Wal-Wal and other points along the border were occupied by the Italians, and the Abyssinian Government made no protest", 95 this despite the assertion by Professor Pitman Potter -who had been one of the arbitrators appointed by Ethiopia to consider the incident -that title by occupation could not have been made effective over the short period of four years, and moreover, that "[a]ll documentary evidence indicates that the frontier in this region [though never demarcated] lay one hundred or more kilometres east of Wal Wal", 96 that is: well within Ethiopian territory. The Walwal Incident was settled by pacific means. An arbitration panel -which included Potter (later to be a Judge of the International Court of Justice), as well as noted international jurists Geouffre de la Pradelle and Politis -determined in September 1935 that responsibility for the confrontation, which left one hundred and si�ty dead, could not be imputed to either State. 97 By the time the Walwal Incident was settled, however, the precipitation towards war was already well in advance. Italian stalling tactics before the arbitration panel meant that the dispute, which had mushroomed beyond the simple issue of Walwal, could not be considered by the political organs of the League of Nations as long as it remained in the hands of the arbitrators functioning not on the basis of the Covenant, but on a 1928 Ethio-Italian bilateral treaty of amity. 98 Such delays were in Italy's interest, as it used the interim period to amass troops in East Africa who, in any case, could not be mobilised until the end of the Ethiopian rainy season, which transpired towards the end September 1935.
Ethiopia, as early as March 1935, realising that Italy was moving troops and war materiel to its possessions on the Horn of Africa, asked that the overall dispute be considered by the Council of the League of Nations on the basis of Article 15, with a look to having the League provide a solution to what John Spencer, a former advisor to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, termed the "threatening military situation in East Africa". 99 For its part, the Council, noting the declared pacific intensions of the parties, differed to on-going arbitration until that panel made its award on 3 September 1935. The Council then established a "Committee of Five" (France, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) which sought to act as a conciliator between the conflicting parties, making quite intrusive recommendations in regard to Ethiopia, calling on it to reorganise various tenets of its government; though it did hold out the possibility for territorial adjustment which would have granted it access to the sea via an Italian port. 100 These suggestions, the Council reported, "were accepted by Ethiopia as a basis of negotiation, but were rejected by Italy". 101 As a result, the Council moved on 26 September to establish a committee of all its members minus Italy (Committee of Thirteen) to report on the larger issue unfolding in East Africa. The previous day, Emperor Haile Sellasie notified the League that his instruction to pull back Ethiopian troops to thirty kilometres from its borders, so as to ensure no incidents might take place and to clearly demonstrate who might well be the aggressor if war was to break out, had now been carried out. On 3 October 1935, the Council received notice from Italy that:
"the warlike and aggressive spirit in Ethiopia had succeeded in imposing war against Italy and had found its latest and complete e�pression in the order for general mobilization announced by the Emperor on September 28. That order stated the Italian Government, represented a direct and immediate threat to the Italian troops with the aggravating circumstances of the creation of a neutral zone [re: the thirty kilometre buffer zone] which, in reality, was only a strategic movement intended to facilitate the assembly and the aggressive preparation of the Ethiopian troops. As a result of the order for general mobilization, the continual and sanguinary aggression to which Italy had been subjected in the last ten years manifestly involved grave and immediate dangers against which it was essential for elementary reasons of security to take action without delay [… has] found itself obliged to authorize the high command in Eritrea to take the necessary measures of defence".
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Italian "self-defence" had thus commenced. Italian motivation for attacking Ethiopia can be traced back to a number of factors. The first was manifest in Italy's opening act of war: the symbolic (though deadly) bombing of Adwa, the site of its humiliating defeat of 1896. 103 In geopolitical terms, Italy saw itself as having been unfairly deprived by the territorial settlement of the First World War, after being promised by France and Great Britain that if they were to benefit territorial at the e�pense of Germany in Africa, that "equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya" 104 would be forthcoming -though this never materialised. This grievance resulted in the fact that Italy saw itself as having come "last into the field of colonial e�pansion and was only able to pick up the scraps". 105 As a result, Italy could not adequately address the apparent Zeitgeist of the era: the need for Lebensraum. As the Italian Ambassador, Luigi Villari, was to write in the Journal of the Royal African Society, Italy "needed e�pansion more than almost any other country. Her rapidly growing, hard-working and industrious population was limited to a metropolitan area half the size of France […] it lacked the raw material necessary for industry, and even a proportion of the foodstuffs for feeding the people had to be imported from abroad. [… The] situation was unsatisfactory and unstable, and the necessity for the occupation of colonial territories became ever more urgent".
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In a newspaper piece attributed to the Italian Prime Minister, Benito Mussolini, it noted "that slavery e�ists in Abyssinia … but it is not for that reason that Italy is preparing herself for action … Nor is an essential argument the question of race … Not even civilisation is the object that Italy has in view"; instead the "vital needs of the Italian people" to land was important, but the "decisive" reason for war was "security in East Africa": "The solution of the problem can only be totalitarian. Any action of e�pansion or any protectorate must be accomplished by military measures. Italy is the only judge of her security in East Africa. But in military terms, the Italo-Abyssinian problem is simplicity and logic itself. The problem admits of only one solution with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva".
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And yet, the notions of civilisation attached to issues of slavery remained a strong element of rhetoric in the Italian justification for war, especially before the League of Nations. A month before the start of their campaign, the Italian Representative had submitted to the Council of the League of Nations a long memorandum which sought to de-legitimise Ethiopia as a less-than-equal State, as unworthy of membership in the League of Nations. Ethiopia, the Memorandum stated "had by her conduct placed herself openly outside the pact of the League of Nations and has made herself unworthy of the trust accorded to her when she was admitted". As a report in The Times of London noted:
"The memorandum turns to the alleged violations of the special pledges made by Abyssinia towards the League, especially that regarding the repressions of slavery, the survival of which "constitutes not only an atrocious offence to civilization and a manifest violation of Article 23 of the Convention, but represents a flagrant violation of the particular obligations assumed by the Abyssinian Government at the time of her admission". Only if the obligations are observed, adds the memorandum, 'can Abyssinia be sufficiently entitled to remain a member of the League'".
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The Italian point of view, however, failed to carry the day; on the 5 October 1935, the Council of the League of Nations established the so-called Committee of Si� "to study the situation and report to the Council so as to enable it to take decisions with full knowledge of the matters involved". "not entitled, without having first complied with the provisions of Articles 12, 13, and 15, to seek a remedy by war for grievances they consider they have against other members of the League. The adoption by a State of measures of security on its own territory [re: the thirty kilometre buffer zone] and within its international agreements does not authorize another State to consider itself free from its obligations under the Covenant."
As such, the Committee of Si� drew the following conclusions: "that the Italian Government has resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations". 112 The Report was agreed to by each of the Members of the Council of the League with the e�ception of Italy. The implications of this determination were far-reaching, as the collective security system of the League of Nations required, under Article 16, that should "any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League", mandating trade sanctions and the possibility of military action.
While the Italian campaign persisted in Ethiopia, the Assembly of the League of Nations moved to establish sanctions, agreeing on 18 November 1935 to five proposals with regard to, inter alia, financial measures, import and e�port of goods; and the reversal of a longstanding arms embargo against Ethiopia and the placing of such an embargo on Italy. Further agreement was reached, in principle, in regard to a petroleum embargo.
113 Yet, the petroleum embargo was never to be, as it was the string which ultimately unravelled the overall sanction regime and caused the abandonment of Ethiopia by the League of Nations. To avoid the oil sanctions -a causa belli for Italy -the British and French sought to propose a settlement. The so-called Hoare-Laval Plan was mooted to the Council in December 1935, however, it caused a major uproar when made public, leading to the resignation of both its authors, the British Foreign Secretary and the French Prime Minister, due to the fact that it "confirmed Italian military gains made up to that time, giving Italy parts of Ogaden and Tegre, as well as an economic protectorate over a large part of the rest of Ethiopia". 114 As Historian George Scott noted "Haile Selassie was being called upon to pay a crippling bill for the privilege of being invaded by Italy and protected by the League of Nations". 115 Ethiopia's reaction to the proposal, delivered by the Emperor, was emphatic:
"We desire to state, with all the solemnity and firmness that the situation demands today, that our willingness to facilitate any pacific solution on the basis of the FrancoBritish proposals would not only be cowardice towards our people, but a betrayal of the League of Nations and of all States that have thought up to now they could have confidence in the system of collective security.
Those proposals are, in Ethiopian eyes, a negation and abandonment of the principles upon which the League of Nations was founded. They would consecrate the amputation of Ethiopia's territory and the disappearance of her independence for the benefit of a State that has attacked her […]". 116 As the proposed petroleum embargo was relegated to a technical committee of the League of Nations in the early months of 1936, it became apparent that not only were oil sanctions not to be implemented, but that the situation in Europe was such that interest in maintaining any sanctions against Italy was waning. Meanwhile Italy was making territorial gains in Ethiopia. John Spencer provides the following pithy narrative of Italian gains in the pages of the American Journal of International Law: "During the month of March, 1936, by means of gas attacks on the northern front, the Italian army was able gradually to demoralize the Ethiopian forces, and, by the end of March, to break their resistance so that the gradual advance […] became, during the month of April, a rout of Ethiopian troops". 117 On 3 May 1936, the Emperor fled into e�ile, two days later, Italian troops occupied Addis Abba; and on the 9 May the Italian Prime Minister, "Mussolini publicly proclaimed the unqualified anne�ation of Ethiopia and conferred upon King Victor Emmanuel III the title of Emperor of that country". 118 With European Powers turning their attention to the situation in Europe and the rise of an aggressive National Socialist party in Germany, the issue of Ethiopia fell to the wayside, the League in essence accepting a fait accompli: "I, Haile Sellassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, am present here today to ask for the impartial justice due to my people and for the help which fifty-two nations had undertaken to e�tend to it when they affirmed, eight months ago, that a war of aggression, in violation of international law, was being waged against Ethiopia".
The Emperor made a noble and impassioned plea for the respecting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the territorial integrity of small and weak States, culminating his speech with the following questions:
"I ask the fifty-two nations who have given a promise to the Ethiopian people that they would come to their aid at the time of the aggression against them, in order to prevent the aggressor from defeating them -I ask these fifty-two nations for their support by upholding their promise. What are you willing to do for Ethiopia?
You, Great Powers, who have promised to give guarantees of collective security, lest small nations be e�tinguished and the fate which has overtaken Ethiopia should befall them as well, have you considered what kind of assistance to provide, so that Ethiopia's liberty shall not be destroyed and her territorial integrity shall be respected?
You representatives of the world assembled here! I have come to you to Geneva to carry out the saddest duty that has befallen an Emperor. What answer am I to take back to my people"?
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The response was, of course, a deafening silence. Ethiopia, though it would retain its membership in League of Nations, would remain under Italian occupation until 1941. The Italian anne�ation of Ethiopia meant that ultimately, the issue of slavery stopped being of concern to the League of Nations. This transpired as first, the League was unwilling to recognise the anne�ation, and thus the Advisory Committee of E�perts failed to reproduce those sections related to Ethiopia of the 1936 Italian submission in its Annual Report; and second, that Italy failed to make a further submission in 1937, and withdrew from the League of Nation in 1938. Returning to the 1936 submission of Italy: in occupying Ethiopia, it sought to justify its action retroactively by, inter alia, pointing to issues of slavery over territory it now deemed to be part of its Empire. In its submission to the League of Nations Advisory Committee of E�perts on issues of Slavery, it pointed to Notes of March and April 1936 it which it announced the "general freeing of slaves in the Ethiopian territories -adjacent to Eritrea and Somaliland -which have been occupied by Italian troops". The Advisory Committee of E�perts noted this in its introduction; however, under a procedure which allowed one State to report on issues of slavery in another State, and thus decoupled it from the report which Italy had prepared for the Committee. Yet, despite this unwillingness to recognise the Italian claim to Ethiopia, the Committee surprisingly included in its Report a section of the Italian submission which quoted from the pre-war long memorandum already mentioned which Italy had re-submitted having originally provided it to the League's Council in September 1935 in an attempt to justify its move to conquer Ethiopia. The Advisory Committee of E�perts reproduced, without comment, the damning conclusions drawn from the section of the Italian memorandum dealing with the "question of the attitude of Ethiopia to the special engagements assumed by that country towards the League of Nations in regard to slavery": " (a) That Ethiopia recognises slavery as a legal condition;
That raids for the capture of individuals for purposes of slavery are continuing on large scale, especially in the southern and western regions of Ethiopia;
That the slave trade still persists;
That the Ethiopian Government participates directly in the slave trade by accepting slaves as payment of ta�es and allowing detachments of regular troops to capture slaves;
That, in addition to slavery proper, there e�ists the institution known as 'gebber', to which the population of non-Ethiopians regions are subject and which is a form of servitude akin to slavery; That the Ethiopian Government taken no account of the recommendations made to it by the Committee of E�perts on Slavery, more particularly as regards the abolition of the legal status of slaves, as appears further from the report submitted to the League of Nations in May 1935". 121 The reproduction of Italy's pre-war claims regarding the attitude of Ethiopia towards the undertaking it had accepted upon entry into the League of Nations was the last words spoken about the issue of slavery within the League of Nations in regard to Ethiopia. A rather sad ending to what may well be considered the saddest episode of the League of Nations -the failure to prevent the anne�ation of Ethiopia by Italy.
Conclusion
The failure to stop or reverse the Italian anne�ation of Ethiopia stemmed from an unwillingness of the European Powers of the League of Nations to truly challenge Italy during the mid-1930s, as they sought to avoid war with that Fascist State which was being pushed into the camp of Adolf Hitler of Germany. Ethiopia for its part could be sacrificed as it was considered by those European Powers as less than a member of the League of Nations. This was made evident from its inception when Ethiopia sought to avoid European and League encroachment by seeking admission, in 1923, to the League of Nations; wherein the British Government saw it as being "unfit" for membership, though it recognised that joining the League might assist Ethiopia in its desire "to raise herself in the scale of civilisation".
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The standard of civilisation which was applied in the Ethiopian case was that of the suppression of slavery and the slave trade, which was attached as conditions for its admission to the League of Nations. Requiring Ethiopia to accept the obligations of the 1919 Treaty of St. Germain -the most up-to-date provisions regarding the suppression of the slave trade and slavery -would not, in the words of an Italian delegate, wound its "susceptibilities, since other States, which had arrived at a higher degree of civilisation, had already consented" to such undertakings. 123 Ethiopia, for its part, ultimately decided that it was better to be part of the League than to be a non-Member, despite having to be admitted with reservation. The admission of Ethiopia had unintended consequences for the League of Nations, as it lead to the drafting of what is often considered the first international human rights instrument, the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery. Despite the fact that the provisions of the 1926 Convention would not apply to Ethiopia during the League era, the Convention acted as a benchmark both as an established definition of slavery and the slave trade, and provided breathing space for Ethiopia in seeking to end slavery and the trade in a progressive manner. This was so as the 1926 Convention did not require the immediate abolition of slavery and the slave trade, but instead called for their gradual disappearance, something which Ethiopia much appreciated and sought to constantly demonstrate to the League through its submissions. For its part, the supervisory bodies of the League, both the Committee of E�perts on Slaves and the Advisory Committee of E�perts, recognised the progress, however slow, that Ethiopia was making with regard to suppressing slavery and the slave trade.
Ultimately, however, Ethiopia's conditional acceptance as a "civilised nation" was challenged when Mussolini's Italy developed territorial ambitions in East Africa. Time and again during the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy -the League of Nations through its Committee of Five, and the European Powers by way of the Hoare-Laval Plan -mediation proposals required that Ethiopian independence be sacrificed to appease Italy. Italian attempts to de-legitimatise Ethiopia in the lead-up to its act of aggression were in large part focused on issues of slavery which resulted in arguing that Ethiopia openly placed "herself outside the pact of the League of Nations". 124 The criteria of civilisation which mandated Ethiopia's conditional admission to the League of Nations was nowhere made more evident than in the long memorandum placed before the League of Nations by Italy in September 1935: "The admission of Ethiopia to the League was a political act based on the belief that, through participation in the system of international co-operation represented by the League, Ethiopia could be led to make by herself the efforts necessary to approach, even though only gradually, the level of civilisation of the other peoples belonging to the international community. […] Ethiopia has shown that she does not posses the qualifications necessary to enable her to obtain, through participation in the League, the impulse required to raise herself by voluntary efforts to the level of the other civilised nations. The League would be defeating its own ends and its own mission if it did not take to heart this lesson of e�perience". 125 Although the League of Nations did not accept the Italian submission, and despite the personal pleas of the Ethiopian Emperor, the League of Nations was unwilling to carry out its collective security obligations as against a European Power. Despite having labelled Italy the aggressor, European Powers abandoned Ethiopia to its fate, as the geo-politics of Europe meant that the "civilised nations" concentrated on positioning themselves for the barbary of what would come to be termed: the Second World War.
